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HLD-10 (October 2006)

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2658
________________
TERRANCE BOYD,
Appellant
v.
JOSEPH SMITH
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-00802)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 13, 2006
Before: CHIEF JUDGE SCIRICA, WEIS AND GARTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: November 21, 2006)

_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
In 1997, in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island,
Terrance Boyd was convicted of a violent crime (murder) in aid of racketeering activity,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Boyd was sentenced to life
imprisonment. After Boyd’s conviction and sentence were affirmed in 1999, Boyd
moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This motion was denied, as were a subsequent
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ
of habeas corpus, and a coram nobis petition.
Boyd, who is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania, proceeded to file another petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 with the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. This petition, and the District Court’s dismissal thereof, are the subject of
this appeal.
In his § 2241 petition, Boyd argues that § 2255 would be an inadequate or
ineffective remedy for him because his claim is not based on newly discovered evidence
or a new rule of constitutional law. Instead, he alleges that he was unable to raise a claim
that his jury was not selected from a representative cross section of the community (and
that the district court erred by not conducting a hearing on this issue) in his prior § 2255
motion because the census statistics necessary to support such a claim were not available
until after his initial § 2255 motion was due. He further contends that his trial counsel
was ineffective because he failed to request fees for expert investigation work and census
statistics under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
Motions pursuant to § 2255 “are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners
can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in violation of the
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Constitution.” Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted). Unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective,” a habeas corpus
petition under § 2241 cannot be entertained by the court. Cradle v. United States ex rel.
Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Section 2255 is not inadequate or
ineffective merely because a petitioner is unable to meet its stringent gatekeeping
requirements. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Rather, the
“safety-valve” provided under § 2255 is extremely narrow, and has been held to apply in
unusual situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to
challenge his conviction for actions later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening
change in law. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120.
Boyd’s claims fall within the purview of § 2255 because they challenge the
validity of his conviction. We agree with the District Court that Boyd has not
demonstrated that § 2255 is an “inadequate or ineffective” remedy under the
circumstances presented here. Boyd does not challenge his conviction on the ground that
an intervening change in the law has rendered his actions non-criminal. See id. at 120-21
(section 2255 not “inadequate or ineffective” where petitioner challenged sentence based
on intervening decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
For these reasons, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that it could not
entertain Boyd’s petition. We will, therefore, summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
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